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I.

INTRODUCTION

S

ubmarine cables are critical links in the infrastructure that enables worldwide communications. This article first examines the vital role that submarine cables play and how communications reliability is maintained by cable
traffic restoration and cable repair. The article then reviews international law
within the context of submarine cable history and the evolution of cable
technology. In Part II it discusses how international law, as codified in the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 1884 Cable Convention, is central
to the success of submarine cable communication. In Part III it provides
examples of how key compromises codified in the Cable Convention can
serve as a springboard to develop new techniques to protect submarine cables from hostile action by third parties and belligerents. Part IV addresses
threats to the submarine cable system during peacetime. Part V discusses
current vulnerabilities in the ability to repair cables during armed conflict and
a recent initiative to address those vulnerabilities. This article concludes in
Part VI by encouraging scholars and policy makers to propose, discuss, and
debate these ideas. It suggests providing for improved cable route diversity,
amending the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Navigation to include submarine cables and cable ships, and according to cable ships an exemption from belligerent attack in wartime.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBMARINE CABLES

A. Fiber Optic Submarine Cable Characteristics
Submarine cables on the high seas are typically 17–22 mm in diameter—
about the diameter of a beer bottle cap. The cable is comprised of a highgrade, marine-quality polyethylene tube with a core of steel wire for strength,
a copper conductor to power acoustical optical amplifiers (repeaters), and
glass fibers for communications. A single cable can have anywhere from six
to over thirty-two fiber optic pairs. The light spectrum in a fiber is divided
into numerous color spectrum wave bands. Each wave band transmits data
independently and simultaneously, yielding a continuously increasing torrent
of terabits of data traveling at the speed of light. There have been continuous
exponential improvements in transmission capacity. For example, while the
8-fiber pair “GTT Atlantic” cable laid in 2001 (connecting the United King-
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dom, Ireland, Canada, and the United States) can carry 2.5 terabits per second, the 8-fiber pair “MAREA” cable laid in 2018 (connecting Spain and the
United States) can carry 24 terabits per second. 1
Cables are chemically inert in the marine environment and have a small
footprint. 2 The power required for the cable is a constant direct current of
about 0.6 to 1.0 amperes—less than the three amperes required for a midrange laptop computer. 3 In territorial seas and exclusive economic zones
where fishing and anchor threats are present, cables may be sheathed with
high quality steel armor wiring. Additionally, cables in these waters may be
buried to a seabed depth of one to three meters, depending upon the seabed
sediment and the fishing threat. Extensive peer review scientific papers document the benign impact of fiber optic cables in the marine environment. 4
B. Submarine Cable Traffic Restoration
A basic understanding of what happens to restore the traffic carried on a
submarine cable when the cable suffers a fault clarifies why submarine cables
have a well-deserved peacetime recognition for communication resilience.
With rare exception, 5 this important topic is not addressed in peer reviewed
literature.
Restoration is the term used to describe the process of rerouting and
restoring traffic on a submarine cable when the cable is down for maintenance or when it has been disrupted by a fault that damages or cuts the cable.
When a fault occurs, two actions are required. The first is restoration of the
traffic and the second is the physical repair of the cable. Each process runs
in parallel and is handled by different professionals employed by the cable
owner. Restoration in peacetime normally takes place in seconds or minutes
while the peacetime repair process takes days or weeks. Cable repair is important not only to get the damaged cable back in operation, but because
each cable is a back-up for restoration of other cable systems.
1. Submarine Cable Map 2021, TELEGRAPHY, https://submarine-cable-map-2021.telegeography.com/.
2. DOUGLAS BURNETT & LIONEL CARTER, INTERNATIONAL SUBMARINE CABLES AND
BIODIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 29–30 (2017).
3. Id. at 53.
4. Id. at 63–71 (references include about forty-four books, papers, and studies addressing various environmental aspects of submarine cables).
5. Mick Green, The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does It Work?, in SUBMARINE CABLES:
THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 41 (Douglas Burnett et al. eds., 2014).
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Before fiber optic cables were used, restoration of submarine cables was
carried out by using other cables or by satellite. With the advent of fiber optic
cables, restoration by satellite is no longer practical. Moreover, major commercial customers in their contracts with cable owner specify that restoration
must be by other fiber optic cables.
In many respects, restoration is the “secret sauce” for submarine cable
resiliency. For example, if a transatlantic cable is cut, in milliseconds the traffic is rerouted to other transatlantic cables. If those are not available, traffic
is rerouted to U.S.-Brazil cables and then across the South Atlantic to Africa
and north to Europe, and if these are not available then across the Pacific
Ocean to Asia landings and thence across the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Ocean to Europe, typically all in seconds or minutes. Restoration like
this is normal and functions well unless large numbers of cables are knocked
out at the same time by major natural disasters or belligerent actions. The
situation will be dramatically aggravated if similar events simultaneously
compromise multiple cables in more than one ocean.
Cable systems are designed with restoration features. One older solution
is to design a self-healing ring cable system where one system has two
roughly parallel transoceanic cables joined at either end by land or submarine
cable to form a ring. In the event of a fault on one leg of the cable, the traffic
is immediately rerouted back around using the other leg of the ring with no
delay or cost. “TAT-14,” taken out of service in December 2020 after a
twenty-year service life, is an example of a self-healing ring submarine cable
system.
Ring architecture is being replaced by point-to-point “mesh” architecture that allows cable traffic to be restored on any cable in which the cable
owner has capacity ownership or an indefeasible right of use agreement. This
avoids having to build two cables in parallel and provides greater redundancy
and flexibility.
Restoration nowadays is largely controlled by revolutionary automatic
switches that, when triggered by a cable fault, automatically reroute traffic in
milliseconds to other transoceanic cable paths. A cable system also normally
has a restoration liaison officer to plan restoration with cable design engineers, conduct exercises with other systems, and handle restorations when
the need arises from a cable fault or repair on a 24/7 basis. Cable systems
may differentiate the costs of services provided to their customers based in
part on the degree and speed of restoration specified in the relevant contract.
This is particularly true for cable owner customers that use the cable system
under lease or indefeasible right of use agreement.
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Cable systems have a 24/7 network operations center (NOC) to monitor
traffic and identify any disruption to the traffic or a change in the normal
operating conditions of the marine portion of their network. The NOC
monitors automatic switching and alerts the restoration liaison officer for
restoration contingencies and the maintenance authority for repair.
There are three restoration options. The first option is self-restoration.
Self-restoration allows a cable owner to restore traffic automatically on other
cables where it owns capacity or fiber pairs. This approach is known as a
“mesh.” Cable content providers and “hyperscalers” 6 like Google and Facebook are designing their global systems to be entirely restored to the maximum extent possible on their own fiber pairs in other systems they co-own.
Their goal is to keep connectivity between their server farms and allow the
“cloud” to function without interruption. Traditional telecom companies
such as AT&T and BT Group (formerly British Telecom) have a different
goal of keeping their direct customers in communication around the world.
This dichotomy in goals between the cable content providers and the telecom companies is a new phenomenon. How these approaches will work in
cases of multiple cable failures, especially in more than one ocean, is an open
question.
In modern fiber optic cable systems extra or spare capacity is reserved
for restoration or future capacity needs. Capacity in cables actively being
used (called “lit” cables) is immediately available for restoration if the cable
is fully equipped. Some analysts fail to calculate that only equipped lit capacity counts for timely restoration. To be considered equipped, the terminal
equipment must have the circuit cards installed to send and receive the newly
activated lit capacity and be fitted with adequate power and cooling equipment in the terminal cable station to handle the increased use. Equipping lit
capacity is expensive and time consuming if it is not already installed. A new
circuit card alone may take four to six months to order from a manufacturer.
Add to that the engineering implementation, testing, and procedures required—it is not an automatic process. The result is that only a fraction of
lit capacity is equipped as cable system operators carefully measure how
much lit capacity they need for business reasons. When an active cable system has unused or spare dark or unlit fibers, there are major expenses and
6. Hyperscaler is a term used in the cable industry to refer to companies that operate
data centers. Hyperscale computing is necessary to build a robust and scalable cloud, big
data, map reduce, or distributed storage system and is often associated with the infrastructure required to run large, distributed sites. Examples are Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft,
and Google.
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time required to bring these dark fibers into operation. The decision to equip
and activate the dark fibers to carry traffic is a carefully made business decision and not one readily available in an emergency.
The second option is through mutual restoration agreements with other
cable systems. In these arrangements—negotiated by the restoration liaison
officer—a cable owner agrees that in the event of a fault or repair on a cable
system under the arrangement, traffic will be restored on the cable system
not impacted by the fault. Normally, mutual restoration agreements are performed at no cost on a reciprocal basis.
A third option is an ad hoc commercial arrangement where a cable system sells restoration services to other cable systems at a posted or negotiated
market price. This type of arrangement is largely replaced by the first two
restoration options but may still be used if the first two options, for whatever
reason, are not up to the task.
Restoration may combine the various restoration options to give a cable
system the required reliability. An important restoration objective is to provide protection and flexibility by spreading traffic among various cable system “baskets” instead of placing most or all of the traffic “eggs” in one or
two baskets.
In a scenario where large numbers of cables are out of service during
wartime or major natural disasters, the normal peacetime restoration process
would be seriously challenged if not overtaxed. There are several reasons for
this vulnerability.
First, unlike historic industry practice, modern mesh restoration is handled by each company using its owned or indefeasible right of use capacity
in the various cable systems in which it has interests. As a result, there is only
limited spare equipped capacity to receive restoration traffic from other cable
systems.
Second, the division of cable system owners into hyperscalers or content
providers and traditional telecom companies introduces different business
models that directly impact restoration. A hyperscaler is focused on service
between its server farms that form its cloud services, not the end customers.
The traditional telecom company is focused on its end customers. Unlike the
traditional telecom companies, the hyperscaler is not disposed or practiced
in allowing third parties to use its systems for restoration. Hyperscalers that
are responsible for the newest submarine cables may have optical amplifiers
and equipment that is not conducive to ad hoc additions of restoration capacity from third parties.
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Third, in a wartime situation, where large numbers of cables are damaged, a likely scenario will be numerous cable owners trying to compete for
the limited restoration capacity available on the surviving cable systems. This
ad hoc impact will likely be chaotic as each company makes decisions about
which traffic has priority over other traffic and national governments struggle to do likewise with priorities on a national scale.
In terms of global resilience for submarine cables, the more diverse the
paths, the better. Route diversity should be welcomed, encouraged, and facilitated by national governments. Many times, this is not the case because
of conflicts with other seabed users like offshore wind and fishing; misplaced
environmental concerns surrounding marine protected areas; and complacent and “stove piped” government permitting authorities that do not consider the international restoration picture.
It is emphasized that there is no government requirement to restore traffic if a cable is disrupted. The pressure and requirement to provide restoration are driven commercially by the cable system’s customers or server farm
connectivity, and its market competition. Sophisticated buyers of capacity in
their agreements have terms dealing with the speed, cost, means, and reliability of restoration. Premium paid restoration options allow a customer to
ensure its traffic has priority over other user traffic. If a cable system does
not meet these contractual terms, its customers will contract with other,
more reliable or cost-effective cable systems. This approach works quite well
in a normal peacetime environment, but the question remains if it works
when large numbers of cables are damaged at the same time.
C. Contemporaneous Submarine Cable Usage and Reliance
International submarine cables, which vary between 131 kilometers and
20,000 kilometers in length, lie on the sea bottom at depths as much as 9,912
meters (exceeding Mt. Everest’s height), do not enjoy automatic protection
or immunity from peacetime theft or intentional disruption or from hostile
actions during wartime.
Before delving into international law, a hard look is in order at just how
dependent countries around the world are on submarine cables. As many
may know, but not often think about, submarine cables enable us to connect
with family, friends, businesses, and even online events like the Disruptive
Technologies and International Law Conference hosted virtually by the U.S.
Naval War College in December 2020, where this article was presented to a
worldwide audience.
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Consider that, without cables, no one would be able to FaceTime, Skype,
Zoom, or communicate internationally on the Internet, whether by video,
data, or voice. All such means of communications would stop abruptly if the
services provided by submarine cables were disrupted.
Unfortunately, satellites do not serve as an effective substitute. The popular belief that modern communications are satellite-driven has not been accurate since the first transoceanic fiber optic cable, TAT-8, was laid across
the Atlantic in 1988.
In fact, in 2007—the year the author testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on submarine cables and the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—if all the submarine cables connecting the
United States to other nations had been cut, using every single satellite in the
sky would have resulted in only seven percent of the U.S. traffic having been
restored. 7 The same exercise today would undoubtedly lower this percent.
An analysis today estimates that only 0.37 percent of U.S. international traffic
is currently carried by satellite. 8
Why? Because the capacity of a single transatlantic cable has increased
by a factor of one hundred thousand in twenty-five years. About fifty-four
of these cables—each with a diameter the width of a garden hose—provide
the United States with over 99 percent of its international communications.
Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and a host of other nations
are similarly situated in their reliance on cables. Submarine cables connect
land-based server farms across the globe, underscoring that the “cloud” is
beneath the sea. 9 Even the server farms may be heading to sea, as demonstrated by Microsoft’s experimental submerged data center, which was
housed in a sealed storage capsule that was retrieved in summer 2020 from
the seafloor near Scotland’s Orkney Islands. 10

7. Hearing on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 110th Cong. 145 (2007) (testimony of Douglas Burnett).
8. Submarine Cable Map 2021, supra note 1 (“Statistics released by U.S. Federal Communications Commission indicate that satellites account for just 0.37% of all U.S. international capacity”).
9. BURNETT & CARTER, supra note 2, at 3.
10. Mike Clare, Successful Deployment of An Underwater Data Centre, INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, Oct. 2020, at 3–4. The 12.2 meter
long, 3.2 meter diameter, pressurized capsule, powered by renewable energy sources, held
855 on-board servers that had a server failure rate one-eighth of a land-based center over
the two-year trial period while operating with better cooling efficiency.
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Consider the massive investment in submarine cables in the last decade
by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and Amazon. 11 As former Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, and former Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General James Amos, note, “Cyberspace, in the physical form
of undersea fiber-optic cables,” carries a greater value of trade, through financial transactions and information, than the value of goods carried at sea. 12
Indeed, each day, the Society for Worldwide Internet Financial Telecommunications transmits about fifteen million messages representing about
four trillion dollars daily to more than 8,300 banking organizations, securities
institutions, and corporate customers in 208 countries. Consider this statement made by Stephen Malphrus when he was the Chief Information Officer with the United States Federal Reserve, “When the communication [cable] networks go down, the financial sector does not grind to a halt, it snaps
to a halt.” 13
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, in the
Oceans and Law of the Sea Report, wrote “Functioning as the backbone of
the international telecommunications system, submarine cables are a fundamental component of the critical global infrastructure and play a direct role
in sustainable industrialization; indirectly they contribute to all other areas
recognized as important for sustainable development.” 14
In 2020, that “backbone” can be measured by the scope of demand on
international fiber optic telecommunication cables—estimated to involve
four billion people, four trillion dollars in revenue opportunity, over twentyfive million applications, more than twenty-five billion embedded and intelligent systems, and fifty trillion gigabits of data. 15 This fact is astonishing
given the garden hose diameter of an individual cable.

17.

11. Id. at 5–6.
12. Jonathan Greenert & James Amos, A New Naval Era, PROCEEDINGS, June 2013, at

13. Stephen Malphrus, Chief of Staff, Federal Reserve Board, Speech at ROGUCCI
Conference (Oct. 19, 2009), quoted in Threats to Undersea Communications Cables 6 (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/1---2017-AEP-Threats-to-UnderseaCable-Communications.pdf.
14. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea Report, ¶¶ 53, 55, U.N. Doc.
A/70/74 (Mar. 30, 2015).
15. Mario Morales, Vice-President, IDC Research Inc., Presentation in the TeleGeography Webinar: New Cable Builds Return to the Trans-Atlantic: What are the Impacts? (Oct.
6, 2015).
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Cable Protection
Committee 16 estimates that Internet traffic increased between 25 and 50 percent between November 2019 and the early stages of lockdown in April
2020. 17 Zoom Video Communications revenue for the quarter ending July
31, 2020, saw a 355 percent increase compared to the previous year. 18
Given the above facts, I phrase the former U.N. Secretary-General’s
words in a slightly different way: Fiber optic submarine cables, in and of
themselves, constitute—by any standard—critical international infrastructure. By understanding that truth, international scholars and policy experts
should grasp the importance of the following nine facts in navigating international law and in proposing solutions to protect submarine cables:
1. Approximately 464 separate international cable systems use 1,245 cable landing stations and about 1.4 million km of fiber optic cables. 19
2. Ninety-nine percent of these cables are not government-owned. Each
cable system is generally owned by separate consortiums of about four to
forty private companies or entities, or occasionally by a single company.
There is no worldwide submarine cable network any more than there is a
world airline network; rather, independent individual cable systems freely
cooperate and compete 24/7 year-round, with virtually no international governance, and with what most of us perceive to be a seamless fit. The world’s
subsea communication systems are provided by free enterprise at no charge
to States!
3. Cables, unlike ships, are not flagged to any one State—nor is the nationality of the cable a simple question. Legal ownership of a cable is logically
divided among the various co-owners, resulting in a legal kaleidoscope of
jurisdictions and nationalities.
16. The International Cable Protection Committee is a non-governmental organization
made up principally by the companies that own and operate the world’s submarine cable
systems and the cable ships that lay and maintain them. See generally International Cable Protection Committee, www.iscpc.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2021).
17. Press Release, International Cable Protection Committee, ICPC Calls on Governments and Industry to Facilitate and Expedite Submarine Cable Installation and Repair During the COVID-19 Pandemic to Protect Internet Connectivity and Critical Communications
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://iscpc.org/news/; See also U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law
of the Sea Report, ¶ 8, U.N. /Doc. A/75/340 (Sept. 9, 2020).
18. Zoom Video Communications Revenue 2019–2021, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stock/charts/ZM/zoom-video-communications/revenue (last visited Nov.
26, 2021).
19. SUBMARINE CABLE ALMANAC, Nov. 2020, https://issuu.com/subtelforum/docs/subtel_forum_almanac_issue_40; Submarine Cable Map 2021, supra note 1.
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4. Cable repair is organized regionally by private contract—subject to no
applicable government mandates. Repairs are carried out strictly by contract
terms, and not according to any national government priority.
5. Cable repair ships are contractually obligated to sail from their base
port within twenty-four hours of notification for fast repair response.
6. Fifty or so cable ships operate worldwide. 20 Half are on standby awaiting a repair call out. The other half are laying new cables.
7. Cable ships are custom built, conspicuous, expensive, and carry specialized crews trained at sea through “hawespipe” experience. These ships
fly diverse national flags (e.g., United Kingdom, France, Marshall Islands,
Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and China).
8. Cable repairs are urgent—each cable system serves as the backup for
other cables that need repair.
9. The environmental footprint of cables on the seabed is benign. 21 Once
a cable is laid, it is designed to remain undisturbed unless it needs repair. The
typical manufacturer warranty of twenty to twenty-five years is not based on
the cable itself, but on the optical amplifier (repeater) that reenergizes the
light, placed every sixty to eighty kilometers in the cable.
While this article concentrates on fiber optic telecommunication cables,
other types of submarine cables traverse—with increasing frequency—the
world’s oceans. Military cables are used for acoustic sensing and antisubmarine warfare. 22 More than an estimated twelve hundred scientific cables provide continuous streams of environmental data that advances our understanding of the oceans. 23 Finally, advances in technology also open the door
to international electrical power cables, such as the 580 km, 700 megavolt

20. Rebecca Spence, Where in the World Are Those Pesky Cable Ships, SUBMARINE TELENov. 16, 2020, at 15 (full-service cable ships capable of high seas operation
involving laying and repair).
21. See generally Burnett & Carter, supra note 2; Lionel Carter, Submarine Cables and Natural
Hazards, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 5, at
237.
22. J. Ashley Roach, Military Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND POLICY, supra note 5, at 330, 340.
23. Lionel Carter & Alfred H.A. Soons, Marine Scientific Research Cables, in id. at 323, 326.
COMS FORUM,
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high voltage direct current “NordNed” cable linking Norway to the Netherlands 24 and the planned 1000 km, 1200 megavolt high voltage direct current
“Icelink” cable between Iceland and the United Kingdom. 25
III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Military, power, and scientific submarine cables have distinct uses and vary
by design and construction, but, under international law, they enjoy the same
rights and obligations as those relied on for telecommunications. The growth
and success of submarine cables—whatever the type—are intrinsically tied
to the protections provided to international cables under international law.
And, that impressive growth—fueled by the endless ingenuity expressed in
cable design, installation, and maintenance—historically depends upon the
freedoms to lay and repair submarine cables under international law in an
unregulated space outside of territorial seas.
A. Historical Treaty Development
From the time submarine cables were launched in the nineteenth century,
technology disruption inflicted by third parties and resulting from natural
causes posed central concerns for diplomats and ocean policy makers.
The first transoceanic submarine telegraph cable was laid in 1866 by the
entrepreneur Cyrus Field. 26 It was as revolutionary then as the Internet was
for us when it was launched in the 1990s. The significance of the then-new
technology was captured by the famed English jurist Sir Travers Twiss in
1880:
The preliminary question, which deserves consideration is whether the
maintenance of telegraphic sea-cables, which have an international importance, is an interest of the highest order of States, analogous to the interest of the public health and of the public revenue, which each nation is
allowed by courtesy to protect beyond the strict limits of its territorial waters.
24. Malcolm Eccles et al., Submarine Power Cables, in id. at 299, 303.
25. Jemima Kelly & Nerijus Adomaitis, Giant Iceland-UK Power Cable Plan Seen Facing
Brexit Delay, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-icelandpower-idUKKCN12L1O5.
26. Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 5, at 23.
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If we look to the public services which the telegraphic sea-cable is now
called upon to perform in time of peace, that it has become the normal
instrument of communication between Governments and their envoys in
foreign countries; that international treaties are from time to time concluded between the nations of the two hemispheres through the medium
of telegraphs; that through the same instrumentality approaching tempests
are announced in advance to Europe from America, by which great damages and destruction to life and shipping may be averted; that no great
criminal can now hope to escape from Europe to the western shores of the
Atlantic Ocean with the fruits of his crime without a telegram anticipating
his arrival, when he finds himself the captive of the law at the moment
when he expect to set his foot upon a land of liberty:
. . .the answer to the question above stated must, we think, be in the
affirmative, and there can be no doubt that the great arterial lines of telegraphs have become indispensable for the circulation of the political life
blood so necessary to maintain the vitality of our modern international
State System. 27

If one substitutes “fiber-optic cables” and “email or text message” for
the words “telegraphic sea-cables” and “telegram,” respectively, all must
agree that Sir Travers’ words are as relevant today as they were in 1880. Further, Sir Travers’ “affirmative” to the question about the critical nature of
“sea-cable” maintenance found results in the pioneering 1884 International
Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables. 28
The 1884 Cable Convention constitutes the world’s very first law of the
sea convention. It was the product of two summers of negotiations in Paris
in 1882 and 1884 that reunited not only diplomats, but also fishermen, naval
officers, and electrical engineers, all striving to devise a legal regime that addressed about twenty years of the world’s experience with the revolutionary
new international submarine telegraph cables. The result is a series of compromises that form the bedrock of modern international law on submarine
cables, as reflected in UNCLOS 29 and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). 30
27. Travers Twiss, Submarine Telegraph Cables, 49 THE NAUTICAL MAGAZINE 879, 883–
84 (1880).
28. Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, T.S.
380 (entered into force May 1, 1888) [hereinafter Cable Convention].
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
30. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct.
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter COLREGS].
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Examining the evolution of how international law affects submarine cables is instructive as one considers ways to avert potential disruptions to this
vital infrastructure. Toward that end, I summarize below the key compromises that are codified in the Cable Convention, as they may provide ideas
for new or updated techniques to avoid disruptions:
1. All States and their nationals enjoy the freedom to lay and repair cables
outside of what was then the three-nautical mile territorial sea. 31
2. Ships that damage a submarine cable because of intentional actions or
culpable negligence are to be subject to criminal penalties of fines and imprisonment without prejudice to the cable owner’s right to recover civil damages. From the start, cables had been cut or damaged from fishing activity
and anchor contacts, and these provisions were designed to punish and deter
not only intentional but negligent actions. Under the treaty, there is an exemption from criminal and civil actions if the master damaged the cable to
save the ship and its passengers. An example would be a ship, losing power
and being driven onto the rocks, on which a crew member throws out an
anchor to prevent the allision, but damages a cable. 32
3. If a vessel, through no fault of its own, snags a cable with its fishing
gear or anchor, the vessel is to sacrifice its gear or anchor to avoid injury to
the cable. If the sacrifice is made, the cable owner is required to indemnify
the vessel for the sacrificed gear or anchor. Here the priority of the Cable
Convention was to prevent the greater harm of communication disruption. 33
4. A cable owner enjoying the freedom to lay cables can cross other cables without permission. If in the process of crossing a cable, that cable is
damaged, the crossing cable owner must indemnify the owner of the crossed
cable for the cost of repairs. 34
5. If a cable ship displays day shapes (i.e., masthead signals showing vessel status) or night lights indicating it is engaged in laying or repairing a submarine cable, other ships are to stay one nautical mile distance from the cable

31. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 1, with UNCLOS, supra note 29, arts.
87, 112.
32. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, arts. 2, 8–12, with UNCLOS, supra note
29, art. 113.
33. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 7, with UNCLOS, supra note 29, art.
115.
34. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 4, with UNCLOS, supra note 29, art.
114.
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ship and one quarter mile from any cable repair buoy and avoid actions that
interfere with the cable laying or repair. 35
Two provisions of the Cable Convention not reflected in UNCLOS
stand out. The Cable Convention contains a provision that allows a party
from a warship to board a vessel suspected of damaging a submarine cable. 36
This provision was relied upon by a U.S. Navy destroyer in 1959 to board a
Soviet trawler on the high seas to obtain evidence of the ship having cut
several transatlantic cables. 37
B. State Practice
The Cable Convention also states that nothing in it “affect[s] the liberty of
action of the belligerents.” 38 State practice is solidly consistent with freedom
of action against cables by belligerents. In 1914, a German Navy cruiser
(SMS Emden) destroyed a British cable station at Fanning Island in the Central Pacific. 39 In 1918, a German submarine (U-151), outfitted with a cutting
device, severed cables between New York and Nova Scotia and New York
and Panama. 40 Another German submarine (U-156), on July 21, 1918, reportedly was attempting to cut a cable between Massachusetts and France
when it was spotted and attacked by two flying boats. 41 Britain’s first naval
acts of war in World Wars I and II were to have ships sever telegraph cables
linking Germany to the Americas. 42 Particularly noteworthy is the action of
the British cable ship Alert in 1914, severing five German cables from Germany to the Azores and the United States. This act deprived Germany of
secure communications outside of Europe, allowing British codebreakers to
35. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, arts. 5, 6, with COLREGS, supra note 30,
r. 18, 27.
36. Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 10.
37. See U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes on Damage to Submarine Cables, 40 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 555, 556 (1959).
38. Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 15.
39. ERIC BROSE, DEATH AT SEA: GRAF SPEE AND THE FLIGHT OF THE GERMAN EAST
ASIATIC NAVAL SQUADRON IN 1914, at 189 (2010); WES OLSON, THE LAST CRUISE OF A
GERMAN RAIDER: THE DESTRUCTION OF SMS EMDEN 56–79 (2018).
40. SM U-151, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM_U-151 (last visited Dec.
9, 2021).
41. JAKE KILM, ATTACK ON ORLEANS: THE WORLD WAR I SUBMARINE RAID ON
CAPE COD 102 (2015); Attack on Orleans, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Orleans (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
42. ROBERT K. MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE WINNING
OF THE GREAT WAR AT SEA 77 (2003).
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read German signals to their embassies, including the famous Zimmerman
Telegram 43 whose publication helped push the United States into war with
Germany.
If the current Russian naval order of battle with ships and submarines
designed to attack international cables is any indication, one can safely assume that State practice recognizing freedom of action by belligerents continues unabated. 44
There is one legal case where a submarine cable’s legal status in war was
the issue. Following the Spanish American War, Great Britain brought a
claim on behalf of English owners of the cable connecting Spain to its colonies in the Americas that the U.S. Navy cut. A 1923 international arbitration
tribunal ruled that while Great Britain was neutral in the war between the
United States and Spain, the fact that the submarine telegraph cables transmitted military information between Spain and its colonies made these cables
legitimate military targets. No compensation was owed by the United States
to Great Britain. 45
A tenuous step was made to protect international cables in wartime in
Article 54 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws of War on Land: “Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory
with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in case of
absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed
when peace is made.” 46 This provision is obsolete and impracticable because
the concept of a neutral cable is meaningless in terms of modern submarine
cable usage, interconnectivity between cable systems, and diverse opaque cable ownership structures. Moreover, even if the weak Article 54 was to be
embraced by State practice—which it has not—it still allows for destroying

43. The Zimmerman telegram, sent by the German Ambassador to Mexico, stated that
if the United States went to war with Germany, and Mexico entered into an alliance with
Germany, Mexico would receive the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona following
the defeat of the United States.
44. Pierre Morcos & Colin Wall, Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (June 11, 2021),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security.
45. Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company, Ltd. (Gr. Brit. v. U.
S.), 6 REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 112 (Arb. Trib. 1923).
46. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 54, annexed to
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
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neutral cables between occupied and neutral territories if a belligerent sees a
need.
The lessons of the 1923 arbitration case, along with the State wartime
practice precedent for modern submarine cables, prove telling. As the noted
law of the sea scholar James Kraska concludes in a recent article, “the technology of the global cable system, and customary law reflected in state practice, suggest that belligerent states would use or even destroy neutral submarine cables during armed conflict.” 47 Professor Kraska is right for two reasons: First, cables, unlike ships, have no flag to confirm their national identity. Legally, ownership of cables reflects many jurisdictions, such that in a
global wartime situation, it is likely that one or more of the part owners is a
belligerent. That alone would justify treating the cables as legitimate military
targets. Second, following the logic of the 1923 arbitration case, the traffic
on modern fiber optic cables undoubtedly carries communications of one or
more of the belligerents. The continuously flowing gigabit-rich slurry of data
packages transmitted at the speed of light over modern cables contain military, diplomatic, government, and economic data. Such traffic is transferred
or switched to other cables in fractions of a second. This undeniable cable
usage, regardless of cable “nationality,” makes the cable a legitimate military
target.
IV.

NON-WARTIME INTENTIONAL ACTIONS AGAINST
SUBMARINE CABLES

Even in peacetime, the evidence highlights noticeable gaps in submarine cable security.
• In November 2007, intentional sabotage of a cable landing in Bangladesh disabled communication for over a week. 48
• Cable segment thefts took place in Jamaica in 2008. 49

47. James Kraska, The Law of Maritime Neutrality and Submarine Cables, EJIL:TALK! (July
29, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-law-of-maritime-neutrality-and-submarine-cables/.
48. Michael Sechrist, Cyberspace in Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communications Cables by
Creating an International Public-Private Partnership 38, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL (Mar. 23,
2010), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/PAE_final_dra
ft_-_043010.pdf.
49. Id.
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• In 2010 terrorists attacked a cable station disrupting a cable linking
the Philippines and Japan. 50
• In March 2013 sixteen tons of submarine cable in the seabed between Banka Island and the Riau Islands in Indonesia was stolen. 51
• The same month, three men were arrested by the Egyptian coast
guard attempting to cut the SEA-ME-WE-4 cable system. 52
• In July 2013, 31.7 km of cable linking Indonesia and Singapore was
stolen. 53
The author’s personal experience with cable theft dates to March 23,
2007, when at least two ships were involved in the high seas removal of
ninety-eight kilometers of cable from the TVH cable system and seventynine kilometers of cable from the APCN cable system. Both incidents included the removal of critical optical amplifiers. At the time, these cables
constituted Vietnam’s entire cable connections to the rest of the world. A
cable repair ship arrived on the scene and photographed one of the ships in
the act of removing cable. The Indonesia Marine security team on the cable
ship declined to intervene because their orders were to provide defensive
protection and not to take offensive action. The repairs took over three
months because a French factory had to be restarted to produce optical amplifier replacements. 54
As these events were unfolding, the author was at a conference in Baltimore. International Cable Protection Committee leadership, including
AT&T (United States), BT (United Kingdom), and Southern Cross (Australia), quickly convened an ad hoc meeting to analyze what were unmistakable and near simultaneous high seas attacks by two separate vessels on two
different cable systems. Assignments were made to contact respective national defense and security agencies. It fell to the author to notify the United
States Navy and Coast Guard. Telephone briefs were provided over several
50. Alfred P. Dalizon, Reds Bomb Cagayan Globe Site, Disarm Guards, PEOPLE’S JOURNAL,
June 11, 2010.
51. Duh, Kabel Internet Indonesia Sering Dicuri untuk Best Tua Kompas [Indonesian Internet
Cables Are Often Sold for Scrap], KOMPAS.COM (Mar. 27, 2013), https://tekno.kompas.co
m/read/2013/03/27/09324795/duh.kabel.internet.indonesia.sering.dicuri.untuk.besi.tua.
52. International Cable Protection Committee, Three Cable-Breaking Incidents Affect Internet, ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, Apr. 3, 2013, at 1.
53. Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables from Intentional Damage—The Security Gap,
in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 5, at 283 n.8.
54. Mick P. Green & Douglas R. Burnett, Security of International Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Time to Rethink?, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 557, 559–563
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2008).
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days. It became apparent that the notification was discussed in high level
briefings, but at the end of the day, no visible actions were taken.
This experience underscores a telling feature of national governance of
critical international submarine cable infrastructure. Many agencies own part
of the submarine cable puzzle, but no agency is in charge. In the United
States, approximately twenty-one government agencies regulate some aspects of submarine cables. This situation—multiple agencies with no agreed
lead—creates a major security shortcoming when cable systems are under
attack or multiple systems are impacted by a natural disaster, such as a major
tsunami or earthquake. 55
Although not the result of a natural disaster, a reef abrasion in July 2015
caused a cable break, rupturing the island of Saipan’s connectivity with the
rest of the world and demonstrating the havoc that can be wrought by a
technology disruption. At that time, Saipan depended upon a single fiber
optic cable. Normally, a single cable break would not be an issue. Worldwide,
an average of two hundred cable breaks, resulting from both man-made and
natural causes, occur each year. Participating in a maintenance agreement
provides for prompt repair and restoration—supplied by cable ships—allowing traffic to be rerouted in seconds so that consumers experience no
impact. In Saipan, however, to save expenses the cable operator did not participate in a maintenance agreement and the local government had allowed
back-up microwave communication facilities to atrophy. Contingency planning, if it existed, was not practiced by the local government and communication company. Thus, the island had greatly diminished international communications for over two months, until the $2 million repair could be completed. During this time, airlines resorted to visual flight rules to land, tourism collapsed, and residents were unable to use credit cards and automated
teller machines to pay for food and other purchases at stores. 56
Imagine the chaos, panic, and disruption that would ensue in major nations if a similar scenario played out where multiple cables were cut, as one

55. International Cable Protection Committee, A Global Comparison of Repair Commencement Times: Update on the Analysis of Cable Repair Data, ANNUAL UPDATE, Apr. 27, 2020.
56. Gaynor Dumat-ol Daleno, CNMI Disconnected: Cut Cable Shuts Down Phones, Banking,
PACIFIC DAILY NEWS (July 8, 2015), https://www.guampdn.com/news/local/cnmi-disconnected-cut-cable-shuts-down-phones-banking/article_eabebf7f-9988-5b8f-820f-49e15
847d074.html; Dennis P. Chan, IT&E: Fiber Optic Cable Strong for Another 32 Years, SAIPANTRIBUNE.COM (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/ite-fiber-optic-cable-strong-for-another-32-years/.
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writer expressed in an article entitled, Forget Nuclear Weapons, Cutting Undersea
Cables Could Decisively End a War. 57
Well-respected legal scholar Robert Beckman highlights the gap in international law with respect to protecting submarine cables from intentional
actions carried out beyond territorial seas. 58 Beckman coined the phrase,
“Submarine cables are the orphans of international law.” He correctly notes
that no applicable international treaty exists to deal with attacks on submarine cables outside of territorial seas by terrorist or “grey” forces. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (together called the “SUA Conventions”) 59 cover aircraft, ships, offshore platforms, and navigational aids, but
are silent on cables.
The October 30, 2020, seizure of the tanker Nave Andromeda in the English Channel by special boat squadron commandos responding to a master’s
SOS because stowaways were threatening control of the vessel is a textbook
case of SUA Convention action. 60 It can also serve, by way of comparison,
as an illustration that no international law covers peacetime cable attacks
outside of territorial seas, even though few dispute how critical cables are to
international economies and State relationships. Beckman’s call to amend
the SUA Conventions to include submarine cables is common sense; a solution to respond to this critical need is long overdue.
We find a similar situation with respect to the wartime protection of submarine cables. Neither international law nor State practice affords any protection to international submarine cables. The likelihood that UNCLOS or
the Cable Convention might be amended to provide such protection seems

57. Steve Weintz, Forget Nuclear Weapons, Cutting Undersea Cables Could Decisively End A
War, THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Dec. 30, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/bu
zz/forget-nuclear-weapons-cutting-undersea-cables-could-decisively-end-war-108651.
58. Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables from Intentional Damage—The Security Gap,
in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 5, at 281.
59. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Convention for Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
60. Stephen Askins, Stowaways Case Rests on Law with Origins in Achille Lauro Tragedy,
LLOYD’S LIST (Oct. 30, 2020), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL113
4488/Stowaways-case-rests-on-law-with-origins-in-Achille-Lauro-tragedy.
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remote. The only attempt to protect cables in wartime by treaty was in 1866
and it failed. The subsequent Cable Convention flatly rejected the concept. 61
V.

CABLE SHIP SECURITY FLEET

A critical element of national security is the availability of cable ships to repair cables in wartime. In the case of widespread hostilities and contested
oceans, there is a strong likelihood that the peacetime arrangements for repairing cables will founder. For one thing, cable ship maintenance agreements contain force majeure clauses that excuse performance of cable ships
in the event of war involving the flag State or major global powers. Even if
the agreements were to be observed, the normal peacetime call out procedures such as the customary “first come, first serve” cable repair priority and
shared international consensus decision making practices would be overwhelmed in a chaotic situation with multiple damaged submarine cables and
multiple cable owners or national governments requesting priority for their
cables. Also, crews will be reluctant to sail in contested waters where the
cable ships would be likely targets. Polyglot crewing with divided national
loyalties adds complexity to manning and operating ships in wartime conditions. Finally, cable ship owners will not risk their ships without adequate
and affordable war risk insurance or national guarantees to replace sunk,
damaged, or captured cable ships, and assume liability for breaking existing
maintenance contracts and other damages associated with hostilities.
Recognition of these reasons was central to recent U.S. government action. An innovative solution to the lack of U.S. flag cable ships in wartime
or national emergency is the Cable Security Fleet (CSF), 62 implemented in
the second half of 2021. The CSF provides for two U.S. flag cable ships to
be accepted into this new critical infrastructure protection program. Each
cable ship operator receives a $5 million stipend annually, provided the cable
ship meets the statutory and related contractual requirements. The annual
stipend is designed to partially compensate the cable ship owner for the increased cost of using a U.S. citizen crew and complying with the requirements for a ship to fly the U.S. flag. A U.S. flag ship allows a highly trained
U.S. merchant marine crew to fulfill its traditional mission of delivering service “in peacetime, in wartime, every time.” The CSF requirements include
61. Douglas Burnett et al., Overview of the International Legal Regime, in SUBMARINE CAsupra note 5, at 65–66.
62. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, §
3521, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019).
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compliance with the terms established by agreement with the Maritime Administration (MARAD), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)—essentially guaranteed availability of a cable ship and crew on twenty-four
hours’ notice following a national emergency declaration and entering a contingency contract with a federal operating authority for wartime operations.
CSF provides the U.S. government with not only U.S. flag cable ships, but
experienced U.S. crews, access to commercial spares (cable, amplifiers/repeaters, universal joint kits, etc.), the cable owner’s marine depots worldwide,
and the ability to leverage the cable owner’s working relationships with other
cable ship owners and operators, survey companies, and vendors worldwide.
The seemingly solid arguments that submarine cables are considered universally as critical international infrastructure, including the means to lay and
repair cables, and the strong endorsement by all national security agencies
were not enough to sway some senior DOT officials. Congress recognized
the compelling needs and acted. The DOT opposition by senior officials is
tied to bureaucratic complacency, outdated concepts of modern technology
and potential disruptive impacts, and a Luddite view that protection of cables
is not important or is a problem for others since transporting data is not
something for DOT’s concern. Even though the Secretary of Transportation 63 directed DOT civil servants to stop delaying implementation of the
law enacted and funded by Congress, the opposition to CSF continues in a
new administration as DOT and the Office of Management and Budget continue to oppose MARAD budget support for this critical program.
VI.

WHAT IS NEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
FIBER OPTIC SUBMARINE CABLES

The traditional freedoms of navigation and laying and maintaining submarine cables are firmly documented in international treaties and customary international law and should not be diluted. If anything, these freedoms should
be publicly recognized and reinforced. Encouraging more diverse cable
paths with streamlined national landing regulation provides added resilience
by timely creating more “secret sauce” of multiple paths for restoration when
63. Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao, after a 2020 formal meeting with
MARAD administrator Mark Buzby and the DOT’s budget director Lana Hurdle, decisively
dismissed the internal DOT budget and Office of Management and Budget arguments
against CSF and directed MARAD to implement the program forthwith. MARAD carried
out the instruction and published the required Federal Register notice to initiate CSF on
January 5, 2021.
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cables are cut. The current arguments by well-intentioned environmental and
world government advocates to establish area-based management and international regulatory control of the world’s cable industry in waters outside of
territorial seas and beyond national jurisdiction compromises one of humankind’s greatest and most remarkable technological achievements. Route diversity based on private industry market initiatives, innovation, financing,
and operation best serves the world in peacetime and wartime.
States should work to close the glaring gap that omits third parties, grey
zone actors, 64 and terrorists from the SUA Conventions by amending the
Conventions to add submarine cables and cable ships to the protection currently provided to ships, aircraft, offshore structures, and navigational aids.
To ameliorate the wartime situation, an idea that perhaps merits further
study involves according to cable repair ships an exemption from attack.
Such an initiative would be modeled on the wartime protection under international law for hospital ships. 65 Cable ships already enjoy peacetime protection from navigation interference when they are laying and repairing cables.
To facilitate that protection, this small class of ships ensure that they are
visually conspicuous 66 by carrying special lights and day shapes. During wartime, further protection methods—like those applied to hospital vessels under international law—could be devised for cable ships in terms of unencrypted communications, public voyage routing disclosure, weapons limitations, and unmistakable ship markings. This modest step contributes to

64. The grey-zone is defined by the United States Special Operations Command as
“competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the
traditional war and peace duality.” U.S. Special Operations Command, White Paper, The
Gray Zone (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Gray%20Zones%20%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf; British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace called the grey-zone “that limbo land between peace and war.” Dominic
Nicholls, SAS Ordered to Start Disrupting Russian Meddling Around the World, THE TELEGRAPH
(Mar. 20, 2021), https://news.yahoo.com/sas-takes-fight-meddling-russians-194726397.ht
ml?guccounter=1; CONOR M. KENNEDY & ANDREW S. ERICKSON, CHINA’S THIRD SEA
FORCE, THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES MARITIME MILITIA: TETHERED TO THE PLA,
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE CHINA MARITIME REPORT (Mar. 2017), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.
65. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 1110B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS ¶ 8.6.3.1 (2017).
66. Cable Convention, supra note 28, arts. 5, 6; COLREGS, supra note 30, r. 18, 27.
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achieving two objectives: the restoration of vital fiber optic telecommunication infrastructure and the fostering of valid humanitarian objectives.
One can argue that the challenge with this idea is the reality—previously
described in this article—that modern fiber optic cables carry traffic that directly or indirectly benefits belligerents. A counterargument could be that
massive attacks on submarine cables would incur the need to repair and restore communications that are critical for global stability and recovery.
There are no easy answers, although the further examination of the topics discussed in this article could yield compromises that serve to protect
submarine cables and cable repair ships in peacetime and wartime. This article concludes by encouraging international scholars, policy makers, and the
cable industry to continue discussing and debating these ideas.

1682

